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Bechthold: Air Support in the Breskens Pocket

Mike Bechthold

O

peration "Switchback" was conceived to
capture the Breskens pocket and liberate
the south bank of the Scheldt Estuary leading
to Antwerp. As the Allies moved out of
Normandy in the late summer of 1944, their
primary supply line remained over the
invasion beaches.
The logistical situation
became critical as the distance from the
beachhead lengthened. The British scored a
major coup in early September when they
captured the port of Antwerp. Not only was
this the largest port in Europe, it had been
t a k e n w i t h its p o r t facilities i n t a c t . 1
Unfortunately, there remained one problem;
Antwerp lay some 50 miles from the Sea. The
only approach to the port lay along the Scheldt
Estuary. The Germans controlled both banks
of this channel and were determined to hold
out to the last. Until the land on either side
could be liberated, the port of Antwerp was
useless to the Allies.

"Switchback" opened on 6 October when
the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade launched
an assault across the Leopold Canal near
Strooibrug. Though a foothold was achieved,
it was tenuous at best. The pressure was
relieved three days later when the 9th
Canadian Infantry Brigade hopped across
the Braakman Inlet in amphibious vehicles
and landed on the eastern edge of the pocket.
This put the Canadians behind the main line
of German resistance and allowed the pocket
to be slowly cleared from the east. The
operation was planned to take a week, but
took nearly a month. Operations in the

pocket were not declared over u n t i l 3
November. 2
The Breskens area was known by the
Germans as "Fortress South Scheldt." It was
ably defended by the 64th Infantry Division,
a reconstructed unit that had at its disposal
a wealth of extra weapons and supplies
acquired from the retreating German 15th
Army. In total, German forces in the pocket
numbered
11,000
men
including
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe u n i t s .
The
Germans were aided in their defence by the
fact that the Breskens Pocket was essentially
an island. It was bounded by the North Sea,
the Braakman Inlet and the Leopold Canal on
all sides with only a narrow, but heavily
defended, land bridge in the southeast corner.
To complicate matters, this was polder country
(fields below sea level). The Germans could
mount a very stout defence by defending the
junctions of the dykes and roads which crisscrossed the area. Moving across muddy and
flooded fields proved to be difficult for the
infantry and impossible for vehicles, even
those with tracks. Travel on the raised roads
was tantamount to suicide. Conventional
infantry attacks could not succeed without
prohibitive casualties. 3
The terrain of the Breskens Pocket was
unlike anything the Canadian army had
encountered and presented a number of
significant challenges. Major R.G. Hodgins,
second-in-command of the Highland Light
Infantry, related that:
53
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Canadian carriers move through the wet, muddy,

Dyke warfare, or "polder-fighting", requires entirely
new t a c t i c s a n d p o s e s m a n y p r o b l e m s i n
consequence. Troops had seldom encountered such
continuous and difficult fighting. Movement is
restricted to dykes and heights of land are unknown.
The enemy is afforded excellent opportunity to use
his many automatic weapons. 4

As a result, operations in the Breskens Pocket
took on the appearance of siege warfare. The
German defenders, well armed with automatic
weapons of various calibre, and with a virtually
unlimited supply of ammunition, enjoyed a
d e c i d e d a d v a n t a g e over t h e C a n a d i a n
attackers. The infantry alone could not
overcome t h e defences —they r e q u i r e d
substantial support from a variety of sources.
Flame-throwers, medium machine guns and
M-10 tank destroyers were all used to good
effect during the operation, but it was the
artillery that was most often singled out for
the support it rendered. The slow-moving
nature of operations allowed the artillery to

flat

ground near Breskens, 28 October 1944.
Photo by ht. Grant, NAC PA 131252

prepare fire plans for "every potential source
of opposition" which were available at very
short notice through the use of codenames.
The infantry felt the artillery was used very
effectively to support their attacks and repulse
enemy counterattacks. 5 However, there was
one other source of support that was of great
assistance to the 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division in helping them clear the pocket:
close air support. 6

B

y October 1944, a sophisticated system
for arranging air support had developed
between the British Army and the Royal Air
Force. The genesis for this organization
developed out of the planning for the invasion
of Europe. It was recognized that the army
and air force would need to form a close
working relationship to ensure success. As a
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result, Second Tactical Air Force was formed
to work with 21 Army Group. At the core of
2nd TAF was the composite group, a powerful
formation composed of fighters, fighterbombers and rocket-firing Typhoons. It was
designed to accomplish a multitude of roles
crucial to the army including the maintenance
of air superiority, the conduct of armed,
photographic and tactical reconnaissance
sorties, artillery spotting as well as close and
direct support missions. 7 Two composite
groups were formed; 83 Group which worked
with Second British Army and 84 Group
which was paired with First Canadian Army.
Formed in J u n e 1943, 84 Group remained
under the operational control of 83 Group
until mid-August 1944. During this time the
majority of its missions involved fighter sweeps
and armed reconnaissance. It was not until
12 August that 84 Group became a fully
operational, and independent, command.
From that point, 84 Group and First Canadian
Army formed a close relationship that endured
until the end of the war. In many ways, 84
Group has never received the attention it
deserves. British historians have been most
interested in 83 Group due to its pairing with
Second British Army and the primacy of their
role during the battle of Normandy. Canadians
have also concentrated on 83 Group due to
A rocket-firing Typhoon of the Second Tactical Air Force warming up for a mission.
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conditions, this support could be requested
and delivered in as little as 15 minutes through
the ASSU and FCP nets. In such a case the
requests would be sent directly from the
forward lines to aircraft orbiting over the
battlefield, bypassing the joint headquarters.
This system had received constant fine tuning
since its baptism of fire in J u n e . By the fall
of 1944 the system was operating most
efficiently.9

S
Major-General Dan Spry (right) talks with Field Marshal Montgomery at 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
Headquarters on 24 October 1944.
Photo by H.A. Barnett, NAC PA 142115

the fact that half its squadrons were supplied
by the RCAF. The fact that 84 Group worked
largely with First Canadian Army and was
thus engaged in operations away from the
"spotlight" has contributed to the minimal
attention paid to 84 Group.
A unique aspect of the First Canadian
Army-84 Group partnership was the colocation of their respective headquarters. This
enabled the air support request system to be
substantially streamlined due to the physical
proximity of the two staffs. It was here, in the
Joint Battle Room and Army Operations Room
that all decisions affecting operations were
made. This control centre acted as the
dissemination point for all information going
to the various Wings and Corps under the
Joint HQ. Decisions concerning the missions
to be flown the next day were made at the
Evening Joint Conference held daily between
senior r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of each service.
Requests for air support originated from the
various staff sections at headquarters First
Canadian Army. In addition to this prearranged support, requests which originated
at the battalion and brigade levels were
forwarded by the Air Support Signals Units
(ASSU) and the Forward Control Posts (FCP)
l o c a t e d n e a r the front. 8
Under ideal

hortly after the conclusion of "Switchback," Major-General D.C. Spry, General
Officer Commanding 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division, wrote a report examining air support
in the operation. Spry began by stating, "The
co-operation and effective support rendered
by the Air Force contributed greatly to the fall
of the Breskens pocket. 3 Canadian Infantry
Division received the maximum air support
during this period and except when weather
conditions made flying impossible, allied
planes were constantly overhead." 10

According to Spry, the direct results of the
air support were quite substantial. Towns
such as Breskens, Ijzendijke, and Oostburg
were destroyed largely by air attack. R/P
Typhoons were responsible for the destruction
of enemy HQs, forward artillery batteries,
observation posts, and various other defensive
positions. In particular, the fighter-bombers
were quite successful in their attacks on Fort
Frederik Hendrik and the heavy artillery that
was shelling the Breskens area from across
the Scheldt in Flushing.
Tactical
reconnaissance had been very successful in
providing the Army with information on enemy
movements and concentrations. The German
communication system was severely harassed
by air a t t a c k s , in p a r t i c u l a r t h r o u g h
"Winkles". 11 Air support was also responsible
for the breakdown of enemy morale and the
raising of Canadian morale. As Spry said,
"The visible results are perhaps of NO greater
importance than the encouragement given
our own troops." 1 2
In addition to the
reconnaissance and attacks carried out by 84
Group, the medium bombers of 2 Group and
the heavies of Bomber Command conducted
over 500 sorties in support of 3rd Division. 13

56
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss2/6

4

Bechthold: Air Support in the Breskens Pocket

A substantial portion of 84 Group's effort
for October was committed to Operation
"Switchback." A total of 9,782 sorties were
flown during the month by 84 Group. This
figure includes missions in close support of
the Army such as pre-arranged and immediate
support, and artillery reconnaissance; direct
support such as armed reconnaissance, and
interdiction; as well as photo reconnaissance,
fighter sweeps and weather sorties. 14 Of
these missions, a total of 1,653 were flown in
close support of 3rd Division in the Breskens
Pocket. 15 Almost one-third of those sorties
were handled by the FCP while a fraction of
t h e r e m a i n d e r w o u l d also h a v e b e e n
impromptu missions arranged through the
ASSU. This shows that 3rd Division had a
significant amount of air support available to
it at short notice and were willing to use it.16
The air s u p p o r t given to 3rd Division
amounted to 25 per cent of the total sorties
flown by 84 Group in close support of First
Canadian Army in October. 17 It is important
to keep in mind that the other divisions of
First C a n a d i a n Army were involved in
operations of their own that also required the
support of 84 Group.

The amount of air support provided by 84
Group is quite remarkable considering the
foul weather that characterized October. On
12 of the 27 days of Operation "Switchback"
84 Group was unable to participate due to
adverse weather conditions. Even on days
when flying was possible, weather restricted
operations. Typical weather reports on those
days showed the commitment of the pilots to
their assigned tasks: "Low cloud and poor
visibility made flying and pinpointing difficult
. . . Weather terrible, between storms pilots
made valiant attempts to attack targets and
had some success...Weather was again bad
but in spite of it air support must go on . . ."18
Since good weather was such a valuable
commodity, 84 Group had to take advantage
when it was available. Twice during the
month of October they set new records for the
total number of sorties in a day. These totals
of over 700 sorties per day even exceeded the
effort put forth during the closing of the
Falaise Gap. The effort devoted to 3rd Division
alone exceeded an average of 100 sorties per
day during flying weather. 19
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An excellent indication of the role of air
support during Operation "Switchback" can
be derived from the battalion war diaries.
During October there were repeated references
to aerial attacks. Early in the operation, on
8 October, when the Canadian Scottish were
engaged in a fierce struggle to expand their
small bridgehead, the battalion war diarist
found cause for optimism. "If a gun position
still gives u s t r o u b l e [after a r t i l l e r y
c o u n t e r b a t t e r y fire] he is a t t a c k e d by
Typhoons. That makes the gun members
wish they had no Feuhrer! [sic]"20 On 12
October the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry
Highlanders (SDGs) reported, "Typhoons
working in close co-operation, 'dead on,'"21
while the next day the North Shores launched
a successful attack in which "The air and
artillery support was a very great factor."22 In
addition to the accounts of air support directly
helping a battalion, the war diaries recorded
many instances where the battalion watched
attacks nearby. On 13 October the Queen's
Own Rifles witnessed a Typhoon attack which
d e s t r o y e d two h o u s e s believed to be
ammunition dumps. Similar instances were
recorded in the war diaries of the Canadian
Scottish, Highland Light Infantry, SDGs,
Regina Rifles, and the North Shore Regiment.
The frequent mention of air support in the
battalion war diaries gives an excellent
indication
its
importance
during
"Switchback." An examination of battalion
war diaries for other periods during the war
reveal a dearth of entries on close air support.
Even during the campaign in Normandy,
where air support operations received a great
deal of attention and credit for the Allied
success, there were few instances when close
air support was mentioned in battalion war
diaries. Operations in the Breskens Pocket
had a number of special features such as the
flatness of the terrain and the slow, deliberate
nature of the fighting. These helped to make
the support more visible to the infantry, but
in the end, the frequent war diary entries are
a clear indication of the importance air support
played in the operation.
Air s u p p o r t played a major role in
"Switchback" from the beginning. Right from
the first assault on 6 October, while 7th

Brigade was clinging to its foothold over the
Leopold Canal, 84 Group flew 190 sorties in
support of the bridgehead. Targets included
mortar and machine gun positions, troop
concentrations and buildings in the immediate
battle area.
In addition,
armed
reconnaissance flights were conducted to
interdict the flow of reinforcements to the
front. The Typhoon squadrons of 123 Wing
were sent a message of congratulations by
First Canadian Army for their attacks on
targets immediately in front of the Canadian
positions. 23
The Operations Record Book of 84 Group
gives a good description of a typical day's air
support during Operation "Switchback":
84 Group aircraft will c a u s e a n d m a i n t a i n
interdiction at the main centres of movement of
SCHOONDIKE [sic], SLUIS and OOSTBURG, at the
same time carrying out Armed Reconnaissance on
the main roads leading from BRESKENS, CADZAND
and OOSTBURG. In addition to this, continued
offensive
action
against known
enemy
concentrations of guns will be carried out; a "free
lance" squadron will be operated solely against
mortar and field gun positions on the front of 7 Bde,
and the V.C.P. will operate "Cabrank" against
immediate support targets. Heavy bombers of
Bomber Command have been requested to destroy
the gun positions East of FLUSHING, which are
directed against 9 Bde. Bombers of 2 Group have
been requested to attack known 17 cm gun batteries
in the area of CADZAND.24

The value of the air support conducted by
84 Group can be seen in the outcome of the
three attacks by the 9th Canadian Infantry
Brigade during the period 21-25 October.
The brigade was given the task of capturing
three of the strongest positions in the Pocket:
the towns of Breskens and Schoondijke, along
with Fort Frederik Hendrik. 25 The first assault
was made on 21 October by the SDGs against
Breskens. The weather that day was typical
for the operation; overcast with intermittent
rain showers. The assault was to be well
supported by the artillery resources of 3rd
Division, 59th Division, and 9 Army Group
Royal Artillery (AGRA). As well, medium
bombers and Typhoons were to strike the
German batteries across the Scheldt at
Flushing and 84 Group was to attack Breskens
and Schoondijke immediately before the
ground assault. As might be expected, the
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Artillery shells landing in Breskens, 22 October 1944. Note the Churchill AVKE at the left side of the photo.
Photo by Donald I. Grant, NAC PA 138437

events did not go exactly as planned. A mixup between 9th Brigade and 3rd Division
delayed transmission of the final air plan to
84 Group. This delay was compounded by
poor weather and soggy landing grounds at
the airfields. As a result, the Typhoons began
their Winkle 25 minutes late. LieutenantColonel Roger Rowley, commanding officer of
the SDGs, was quite critical of the initial air
effort. The battalion war diary recorded his
belief that the Winkle was a "farce." He had
expected a greater effort and was disappointed
when only cannon fire was employed in the
attack with no use of rockets or bombs. In
spite of the disappointing start, the war diaries
of both the SDGs and 9th Brigade record that
Typhoons, available on immediate call through
ASSU channels, provided effective support
throughout the day. By nightfall, the town of
Breskens, a cornerstone of the German
defences, had fallen to Canadian troops and
patrols were beginning to probe Fort Frederik
Hendrik. 26 In total, 84 Group flew 196 sorties
in support of 3rd Division that day while the
medium bombers of 2 Group contributed an
additional 192 sorties. 27
On 22 October, the weather turned nasty
and flying operations were suspended for the
next six days. This meant that the planned

assaults on Schoondijke and Fort Frederik
Hendrik would have to go ahead without air
support. After Breskens had been secured
the Highland Light Infantry were sent to
capture Schoondijke. Along with Breskens,
Oostburg and Sluis, Schoondijke had become
an anchor in the enemy's secondary defensive
line following the 9th Brigade landings. Since
early October the town had been subjected to
continuous air attacks, by both fighterbombers and medium bombers.
General
Spry reported that Schoondijke had been
almost totally destroyed by the combination
of bombing and artillery. 28 The HLI attack on
the afternoon of 22 October met stiff resistance
and heavy shelling. This was overcome
partially through the use of flamethrowers
and the town was largely secured by nightfall. 29
The first attempt to capture Fort Frederik
Hendrik was made on the morning of 22
October by two companies of the North Nova
Scotia Highlanders supported by artillery and
medium machine guns. The old fort had been
heavily pounded by Second TAF and the
Royal Artillery in the past but the Germans
had constructed new concrete positions
inside. Initially the North Novas made good
progress but they were met by heavy fire
when troops attempted to infiltrate the outer
59
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perimeter of the fort. Because of the stiff
opposition, the decision was made to withdraw
and prepare a set piece attack well supported
by the RAF. Fortunately, before that could
occur, a deserter from the Fort was captured.
He was sent back with the message that "the
whole weight of available resources would be
brought to bear" on the garrison the following
morning if they failed to surrender. The
threat of another major bombardment by the
joint resources of the RAF and artillery was
sufficient to spur the remaining Germans to
surrender.30
T h e s e e x a m p l e s give an
indication of the role that air support can
play in a battle. The direct effects of air
support are devastating, but the cumulative
and psychological effects cannot be easily
dismissed. Air support was not a miracle
weapon. It will not turn a defeat into a victory
or take the place of the infantry but it did help
to achieve limited objectives at a great saving
in lives and time.
As was seen in the case of Fort Frederik
Hendrik, air power can affect the battlefield
in an indirect manner. On a number of
occasions the battalion war diaries recorded
instances where air attacks led directly to the
surrender of large numbers of prisoners. The
impact on-German morale was also noted. In
one amusing incident, a prisoner captured by
the SDGs reported that an air attack had
destroyed his company's field kitchen. This
particular attack had a serious effect on the
unit's morale because, "as a result they get
cold food as a steady diet." 31 On a more
serious note, the Queen's Own Rifles war
diarist commented on the effects of the support
they received: "With the first clear day in a
Opposite—
Top: The town of Schoondtjke was one of the cornerstones of German defences in the Breskens Pocket
and as such was subjected to repeated air and artillery bombardment. It can be seen from this photo,
taken on 18 October, that the town was virtually
levelled. It wasjinally captured by the Highland Light
Infantry on 22 October.
WW Air Photo 22313013
Bottom, left and right: Fort Frederik Hendrik, on 11
September, before Operation "Switchback" commenced, and on 18 October, four days before itfinally
fell to the SDGs.
WLU Air Photo 162/4123 & 223/4031.

while [28 October], we got lots of air support.
Typhoons started out early and made things
pretty hot for Jerry. According to PWs
[prisoners of war] they are a great morale
breaker as well as doing a lot of damage." 32
These effects were also noticed by the RAF. A
report by 84 Group stated that German
artillery stopped firing when Allied aircraft
were in the vicinity. The mere threat of air
attack was sufficient to p u t the German guns
out of action. 33 A similar conclusion was
arrived at in a joint report prepared by the
operational research sections of Second
Tactical Air Force and 21 Army Group:
With the exception of G.A.F. anti-aircraft gunners,
P. W.s stated that they always took cover immediately
[when] the Typhoons started to attack and remained
there for times varying from 1 to 10 minutes
afterwards; they expected planes to circle round
and strafe again. It seems that a succession of
attacks suitably timed have a very great effect on
morale . . . It has even been found that the very
presence of our aircraft over the battlefield is
sufficient to cause the enemy to remain under
cover.34

This effect w a s confirmed d u r i n g t h e
interrogation of the commander of the German
division in the Pocket. According to the report,
"General Eberding said that our air support
had caused him some casualties but that its
greatest effect was to prevent movement by
day and limit the activity of his artillery." 35
These are not direct effects of air power but
spin-offs derived from enemy knowledge of
the potential power of air attack which is
backed by a constant presence in the skies.
Air power was definitely not the decisive
factor in determining the success of Operation
"Switchback." No amount of air support
could replace the job of the common soldier
who had to fight his way from dike to dike
across each succeeding polder. What air
power did accomplish, however, was to make
that job somewhat easier. Major-General
Spry credited air operations with bringing
O p e r a t i o n " S w i t c h b a c k " to a q u i c k e r
conclusion by materially assisting in the
victory. 36 In this sense, the support rendered
to 3rd Division was crucial to the success of
the operation because the quicker the Scheldt
was cleared, the sooner the port of Antwerp
could open and the faster the war would end.
61
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